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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Phillip Duane Flieger appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and course of proceedings 
underlying Flieger's convictions as follows: 
A pickup driven by Flieger was stopped by a police officer for 
a traffic violation. A drug detection dog and handler arrived to assist 
in the stop, and the dog alerted to Flieger's vehicle. After the dog 
alerted, Flieger consented to a search of his person and the officers 
found over five thousand dollars in cash and a motel key. The 
officers then conducted a search of the pickup and found pouches 
containing heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and drug 
paraphernalia. Flieger was arrested and charged with three counts 
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 
At the time of the stop, Flieger was on probation for 
possession of methamphetamine. Upon Flieger's arrest, his 
probation officer was informed that a motel key was found in 
Flieger's pocket. The probation officer went to the motel, 
conducted a search of the room, and found methamphetamine and 
drug paraphernalia. The probation officer also conducted a search 
of a vehicle parked at the motel, which belonged to Flieger's wife, 
but no drugs were found in the car. Flieger pied not guilty to the 
charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver. Flieger claimed that he had no knowledge of the drugs and 
that they had been left in his pickup by an individual who had 
borrowed it earlier in the day. Flieger claimed that he had a large 
amount of cash because he was going to buy a car for his wife. 
Flieger further asserted that he had rented the motel room because 
his house was being fumigated and because he and his wife 
needed to spend more time together away from their family. 
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce 
evidence of other acts pursuant to I.RE. 404(b). Specifically, the 
state sought to admit evidence that: (1) Flieger had a prior 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine and was on 
1 
probation at the time of his arrest; (2) Flieger rented the motel room 
(on this occasion and numerous prior occasions) and that 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia were found therein on the 
day of his arrest; (3) Flieger tested positive for methamphetamine 
use on the day of his arrest; and (4) in Flieger's previous 
possession of methamphetamine case, he claimed he had a large 
amount of cash because he was going to buy a car for his 
daughter. After conducting an I.R.E. 404(b) hearing, the district 
court ruled that the state could present evidence of Flieger's prior 
conviction and probation status, his methamphetamine use, and 
that drugs and paraphernalia were found in the motel room. The 
district court ruled that evidence Flieger rented a motel room was 
not a bad act within the meaning of I.R.E. 404(b) and was 
admissible. The district court also ruled evidence showing that, in 
his prior case, Flieger claimed to have a large amount of cash to be 
used for buying a car for his daughter was inadmissible because it 
would be unfairly prejudicial. 
At trial the state presented evidence of Flieger's prior 
conviction, his probation status, and that Flieger rented a motel 
room in which drugs and paraphernalia were found. The state also 
presented evidence that Flieger submitted to a urinalysis drug test 
on the day of his arrest, but did not present evidence of the results 
of the test. During trial, the prosecutor also elicited testimony 
regarding Flieger's post- Miranda silence. 
State v. Flieger, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 514, Docket No. 36866, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App., June 9, 2011 ). 
The jury found Flieger guilty of three lesser included counts of possession 
of controlled substances. (R., pp.732-734, 1008.) Flieger then admitted prior 
convictions which subjected him to the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement. (R., p.1010.) The district court sentenced Flieger to three 
concurrent unified life sentences, each with 10 years fixed. (R., pp.413-418, 
1233.) 
On direct appeal, Flieger argued: (1) the district court abused its discretion 
by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of his prior methamphetamine possession 
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conviction, his probation status, and the existence of drugs and paraphernalia 
found in the motel room; and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
eliciting testimony from a police officer about Flieger's post-Miranda silence. 
Flieger, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 514. The Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
(1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence; and (2) while the prosecutor's solicitation of testimony regarding 
Flieger's post-Miranda silence was improper, Flieger failed to establish 
fundamental error because he could not show that the testimony impacted the 
outcome of the trial in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, and the 
passing and innocuous nature of the reference. kl 
Flieger then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.13-17.) 
Flieger raised numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel, and of violations of various other constitutional rights. (R., pp.13-159.) 
In support of the petition, Flieger submitted a brief, an affidavit, most of the 
records and transcripts associated with his underlying conviction, and letters 
between himself and his trial and appellate attorneys. (See generally R.) The 
district court appointed counsel to represent Flieger. (R., p.651.) Appointed 
counsel chose not to amend Flieger's prose petition. (R., pp.668-669.) 
After a hearing, the district court summarily dismissed Flieger's petition 
after concluding that Flieger failed to assert facts that would, if true, entitle him to 
relief as to any of his claims. (1/14/13 Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.50, L.21.) The court 
also concluded that Flieger waived his non-ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims by failing to raise them in his direct appeal. (1/14/13 Tr., p.49, Ls.10-12.) 
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The court chose not to prepare a written memorandum opinion, but instead 
adopted the arguments and reasoning set forth in the state's motion for summary 




Flieger's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as 
required by I.AR. 35(a)(4). 
The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Flieger failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Flieger Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Flieger contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) However, a review of 
the record reveals that Flieger failed to allege facts, which, if true, demonstrate 
he was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
C. Flieger Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Relief As To Any Of His 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. l.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 
P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
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Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative, if the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). 
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the 
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone 
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a 
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the 
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. kt 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
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137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by 
specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 690 
(1984 ). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
In this case, Flieger's petition, supporting affidavit, and appellant's brief 
are lengthy, repetitive, and difficult to decipher. Further, on appeal, Flieger does 
not assign any specific error to the district court, 1 but instead largely repeats, 
1 This Court may affirm the district court's summary dismissal of Flieger's petition 
on the alternative basis that he failed to assign specific error to the district court. 
It is well settled that the appellate court will not review actions of the district court 
for which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search the record for 
errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); see also 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a party waives an 
issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking). 
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often verbatim, sections of his brief in support of his petition submitted below. 
(Compare Appellant's brief with R., pp.72-159.) It is thus difficult both to identify 
the claims raised, and to thoroughly respond to each of them. Flieger references 
nearly every aspect of the underlying proceedings that did not go in his favor, 
and, in a conclusory fashion, assigns allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, court error, and/or prosecutorial misconduct to each corresponding 
attorney determination and court ruling. (See generally Appellant's brief; R., 
pp.13-159.) Flieger has generally failed to provide admissible evidence or 
context to support these allegations. 
In order to construe Flieger's petition, Appellant's brief, and the claims 
raised within, the state relies upon the motion for summary dismissal submitted 
by the state below. (See R., pp.1251-1280.) The district court did not prepare its 
own memorandum opinion in summarily dismissing Flieger's petition, but instead 
adopted the arguments and reasoning set forth in the state's motion. (1 /14/13 
Tr., p.48, Ls. 9-15; p.50, Ls.14-19.) On appeal, Flieger does not argue that the 
district court failed to address any of his claims in dismissing his petition, or that 
the state or the court mischaracterized any of his claims. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) Thus, all of the claims potentially at issue before this Court are 
contained within the state's motion for summary dismissal submitted below. 
Based upon the state's motion for summary dismissal, the state construes 
Flieger's appeal as challenging the district court's summary dismissal of the 
following ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) Ineffective assistance of 
counsel with regard to the motion to suppress; (2) Ineffective assistance of 
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pretrial counsel Williams;2 (3) Ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel Bingham; 
(4) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel Brown; and (5) Ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel Curtis. Flieger has failed to show error in the district court's 
dismissal of any of these claims. 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel With Regard To The Motion To 
Suppress 
Flieger asserts that his counsel was ineffective with respect to his motion 
to suppress in that counsel: failed to challenge the state's evidence, inadequately 
chose witnesses, inadequately cross-examined the state's witnesses, failed to 
point out false officer testimony, failed to adequately prepare, and failed to 
present an argument regarding the length of his detention during the stop. (See 
R., pp.1263-1265.) 
Prior to trial, Flieger filed a motion to suppress, alleging that that the officer 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. (See R., pp.1060-1116.) The 
district court denied the motion. (R., pp.1109-1114.) Specifically, the court found 
that the testifying officer was credible, and that the officer did observe Flieger run 
through a stop sign prior to initiating the traffic stop. (R., pp.1109-1112.) Further, 
the district court found that, based upon its review of the testimony and audio 
recordings of the stop, the officer did not unreasonably extend the duration of the 
traffic stop in order to summon a drug dog. (R., pp.1112-1114.) The drug dog, 
2 Williams, Flieger's original appointed attorney, was permitted to withdraw from 
the case after Flieger filed a motion for appointment of substitute counsel. (R., 
pp.298-299, 1147-1150, 1253-1254.) Bingham, Flieger's second appointed 
counsel was also permitted to withdraw upon Flieger's request. (R., pp.335-352, 
1171-1173, 1178-1179.) 
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the district court found, arrived on scene while the officer was still processing 
Flieger's driving infraction. (Id.) Flieger did not challenge this determination on 
direct appeal. See Flieger, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 514. 
Flieger's assertions regarding ineffective assistance of his counsel with 
regard to the motion to suppress are conclusory and not supported by admissible 
evidence. Flieger has also failed to attempt to show how any alleged deficiency 
actually prejudiced him. Further, a review of the transcript of the suppression 
hearing disproves several of Flieger's assertions. Flieger's counsel cross-
examined the testifying officer and vigorously and thoroughly challenged his 
version of events in his argument to the court. (R., pp.1088, 1090-1104.) 
Flieger's counsel called both Flieger and Flieger's step-daughter to testify and 
thoroughly examined them both. (R., pp.1065-1073, 1090-1104.) Further, 
contrary to Flieger's contention, the transcript of the suppression hearing reveals 
that while his counsel apparently did not raise the issue of the duration of the 
traffic stop in the suppression motion itself, he did make such an argument during 
the hearing, and the district court considered this argument. (R., pp.1101-1104, 
1112-1114.) Flieger's disagreements with his counsel's strategies in pursuing 
the motion (and ultimately, Flieger's disagreement with the district court's denial 
of the motion), do not demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective. 
2. Ineffective Assistance Of Pretrial Counsel Williams 
Flieger asserts pretrial counsel Tim Williams was ineffective for: being "in 
concert" with the state, waving Flieger's right to a speedy trial without his 
consent, failing to adequately interview witnesses and to prepare for trial, failing 
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to preserve evidence, and by withholding material evidence. (See R., pp.1275-
1276.) 
Flieger's assertions are conclusory and not supported by admissible 
evidence. Flieger has failed to provide context or specifics regarding these 
allegations. He has not attempted to argue how any of these alleged deficiencies 
ultimately prejudiced him, considering Williams withdrew from the case prior to 
Flieger's jury trial. Flieger's arguments about additional evidence Williams should 
have uncovered are not supported by admissible evidence that such evidence 
actually exists, or by any evidence or argument regarding what Williams could 
have done to obtain such evidence. 
Further, evidence submitted by Flieger in the course of the post-conviction 
proceedings disproves several of his allegations. This evidence, including letters 
and court filings of the Williams Law Office (R., pp.296, 306-307, 361-362), 
demonstrate Williams' active participation in this case, including his 
communications with Flieger, his managing of the case, and his identification of 
potential witnesses. 
The basis of Flieger's speedy trial argument in this case arose after a 
warrant was issued for Flieger's arrest on a probation violation in a separate 
case. (R., pp.303-307, 363-366.) The day before the scheduled trial on the 
charges in the present case, the warrant remained outstanding, and Flieger had 
still not been located by either his probation officer or his attorney. (Id.) The 
district court set a final deadline of 4:00 p.m. the afternoon before trial for Flieger 
to be located, and then vacated the trial setting after Flieger had still not made 
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contact with his attorney or probation officer by that time. (Id.) Flieger was not 
arrested on the warrant until approximately midnight the night before the 
originally scheduled trial date. (R., p.1136.) Later, Flieger moved for dismissal of 
the case on speedy trial grounds based upon this postponement, and raised the 
issue again during the jury trial. (R., pp.933-940, 1160-1162, 1185-1205.) Both 
times, the district court denied the motion, concluding that Flieger failed to 
demonstrate prejudice. (R., pp.940, 1206-1211.) 
In a letter to the Idaho State Bar in response to a complaint initiated by 
Flieger, Williams represented that, contrary to Flieger's "belief," he never waived 
Flieger's speedy trial rights, and that it was not his decision to vacate the trial. 
(R., p.304.) Indeed, there is no indication in the record that the district court's 
vacating of the trial setting was based upon any speedy trial waiver, as opposed 
to Flieger's disappearance and the outstanding warrant. The court's minute entry 
and order depicting the events in question do not reference any speedy trial right 
waiver, but instead describe how the court vacated the trial setting upon reaching 
the 4:00 p.m. deadline for Flieger's appearance. (R., pp.1134-1137.) Further, 
Flieger has failed to present admissible evidence demonstrating that Williams, or 
any of his other appointed attorneys, inadequately raised the speedy trial issue. 
Finally, as discussed below, the record supports the district court's denials of 
these motions, and thus, Flieger cannot demonstrate prejudice from any 
deficiency. 
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3. Ineffective Assistance Of Pretrial Counsel Bingham 
Flieger asserts pretrial counsel Loren Bingham was ineffective for: 
inadequately preparing for trial, refusing to go to trial, failing to obtain a bond 
reduction hearing, failing to file pretrial motions, and failing to obtain exculpatory 
evidence. (See R., p.1276.) 
Flieger's assertions are conclusory and not supported by admissible 
evidence. Flieger has failed to provide context or specifics regarding these 
allegations. He has also not attempted to argue how any of these alleged 
deficiencies ultimately prejudiced him, considering Bingham withdrew from the 
case prior to Flieger's jury trial. Flieger's arguments about additional evidence 
Bingham should have uncovered are not supported by evidence that such 
evidence exists, and do not demonstrate what Bingham could have done to 
obtain it. 
Further, Flieger's claims that Bingham failed to file pretrial motions or 
obtain a bond reduction hearing are disproven by the record. Bingham filed a 
motion to dismiss the charges against Flieger on speedy trial grounds on March 
10, 2009 (R., pp.1160-1162.) Bingham also filed a motion for bond reduction, 
and a hearing on this motion was conducted in December 2008. (See R., 
pp.1153-1155, 1200.) Flieger has not attempted to present admissible evidence 
demonstrating that Bingham's performance was deficient as to either of these 
motions, or that any such deficiency resulted in prejudice. 
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Finally, even if Flieger's assertion that Bingham "refused to go to trial," 
was supported by admissible evidence, Flieger cannot show prejudice from any 
such deficiency where he did ultimately have a jury trial on his charges. 
4. Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Brown 
Flieger asserts trial counsel Daniel Brown was ineffective for: inadequately 
preparing for trial, failing to stop prosecutor misconduct, failing to stop the state's 
and district court's "intimidation" of a witness, failing to object to the admission of 
I.RE. 404(b) evidence regarding methamphetamine found in his motel room the 
day of his arrest, and failing to object to the prosecutor's statements at 
sentencing which, he contends, led to a double jeopardy violation. (See 
generally R., pp.1262-1279.) 
Again, Flieger's assertions are conclusory and not supported by evidence. 
As with his pretrial counsel, Flieger has failed to provide context or specifics 
regarding these allegations, and has not attempted to argue how any of these 
alleged deficiencies prejudiced him. 
A review of the trial transcript reveals that Brown zealously and 
competently defended Flieger, and was well-prepared for trial. (See R., pp.802 -
1011.) Brown thoroughly cross-examined the state's most substantive witnesses, 
offered a cogent opening statement and closing argument, called and thoroughly 
questioned six defense witnesses, made appropriate objections, renewed 
Flieger's prior motion to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds, and was 
actively engaged in various evidentiary disputes arising over the course of the 
trial. (Id.) A letter from Brown's law office sent to Flieger prior to the jury trial 
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further demonstrates Brown's ample trial preparation and active involvement in 
pursuing Fliegel's defense. (R., pp.310-312.) 
A recurring theme underlying several of Flieger's claims, including his 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, concerns a potential defense witness 
identified only as "Juan" or "Booger," whom, Flieger asserts, was unable to testify 
because he had been deported by the time of Fleiger's re-scheduled trial. (R., 
pp.933-940.) Flieger asserts that this witness, if called, would have claimed 
ownership of the drugs found in Flieger's vehicle. (Id.) However, Flieger has 
failed to concretely identify this witness, provide any specific admissible evidence 
about what this person would have actually testified to, whether he would have 
actually been willing to incriminate himself to exonerate Flieger, or that he was 
truly unavailable by the time of the re-scheduled trial date.3 Flieger's entirely 
speculative arguments regarding "Juan"/"Booger" are thus insufficient to 
demonstrate he is entitled to relief as to any of his claims in which he references 
this person. 
Flieger's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to stop the 
state's and court's "intimidation" of witness Jason Berry is clearly disproven by 
the record. Berry himself testified that he did not feel pressured or compelled to 
either waive, or assert, his Fifth Amendment rights. (R., pp.910, 947.) Further, 
as discussed below, the district court's mere advisement to Berry regarding his 
Fifth Amendment rights did not constitute impermissible "intimidation." In any 
event, Flieger has failed to show that his trial counsel's performance regarding 
3 The state argued that "Booger" was a fabrication of Flieger and did not exist. 
(R., p.935.) 
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Berry prejudiced him in light of the district court's exclusion of much of Berry's 
testimony on hearsay grounds. (R., pp.944-945.) 
Flieger also has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's failure to object to the state's trial reference to his post-Miranda silence. 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals previously recognized, the remark was "passing", 
and "as a part of a narrative of events, was not of such a nature that the jury 
would necessarily construe the officer's remark as a comment on Flieger's 
exercise of his right to remain silent." See Flieger, 2011 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 514, p.5. Further, the Court recognized the evidence against Flieger was 
"overwhelming."4 kL The Court was "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a jury would have found Flieger guilty of three counts of possession of a 
controlled substance even if the officer had not made the passing reference 
about Flieger's silence." kL Flieger has not attempted to demonstrate why this 
conclusion was incorrect, or how exactly he was prejudiced by any deficient 
performance regarding trial counsel's handling of the trial reference to his post-
Miranda silence. 
Flieger also cannot show that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to certain I. R. E. 404(b) evidence. In a pre-trial evidentiary ruling following 
a hearing, the district court specifically ruled that this evidence was admissible. 
(R., pp.1129-1133.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed this determination on 
direct appeal. See Flieger, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 514, pp.2-4. Flieger's 
4This overwhelming evidence of Flieger's guilt also defeats any prejudice 
argument with regard to Flieger's other ineffective assistance of pretrial and trial 
counsel claims and sub-claims. 
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counsel was not required to futilely attempt to renew Flieger's objections to the 
admission of this evidence at the trial itself. Further, Flieger has not attempted to 
show that his counsel's performance in opposing the admission of this evidence 
was deficient, or that any such deficiency resulted in prejudice. To the contrary, a 
review of the transcript of the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing demonstrates that Flieger's 
counsel vigorously opposed the admission of the evidence in question. (R., 
pp.1127-1133.) 
Finally, Flieger cannot show that his trial counsel's failure to challenge the 
district court's sentencing determination on double jeopardy grounds constitutes 
deficient performance. As discussed in greater detail below, a district court's 
consideration of, or reference to, a defendant's conduct other than that for which 
he was convicted does not constitute punishment for that other conduct, and 
does not result in a double jeopardy violation. Flieger can therefore not show 
either deficiency or prejudice with regard to this claim. 
5. Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Curtis 
Flieger asserts that Justin Curtis, his appellate counsel, was ineffective for: 
failing to raise certain issues on appeal, including the district court's denial of his 
motion to suppress and motion to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds; 
failing to communicate with him; failing to correct errors in his Appellant's brief; 
and failing to supplement the argument on appeal. (See generally R., pp.1265-
1279.) 
The two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel 
discussed above applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
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Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. 
State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007)). In order to establish 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner has the burden of proving 
that his counsel's representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency 
was prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 
27 4, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant requests that certain 
issues be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to 
raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 
1174, 1181 (1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). The relevant inquiry is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the 
defendant would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 
(2000); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (citing 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008)). 
A review of the record reveals that appellate counsel's decisions regarding 
which issues to raise on direct appeal were tactical and based upon a reasonable 
analysis of the merits of potential issues, and not upon ignorance of the law or 
some other deficiency. (See R., pp.613-615 (letter from Curtis to Flieger 
explaining why he declined to pursue certain claims proposed by Flieger).) 
Further, a review of the Appellant's brief demonstrates that Curtis 
competently raised several issues and sub-issues (R., pp.429-456), each of 
which, the state submits, were more potentially meritorious than the claims 
19 
Flieger sought to raise on direct appeal, and subsequently attempted to raise for 
the first time in his post-conviction petition (See Sec. D, below). 
Further, Flieger has failed to demonstrate that any of the claims he feels 
his appellate counsel should have raised had a reasonable probability of actually 
succeeding. To the contrary, as discussed below, several of these proposed 
claims clearly lack merit. 
Finally, Flieger's claims that his appellate counsel failed to communicate 
with him, and failed to correct errors in the appellate briefing are both disproven 
by the record. Letters between Flieger and Curtis, and Flieger and another 
SAPD attorney, demonstrate Curtis' attempts not only to keep Flieger informed, 
but also to explain, in detail, his decision not to raise certain issues on appeal. 
(R., pp.605-606, 612-615, 618-619, 1247-1249; see also pp.647-650 (Idaho 
State Bar counsel discussing her finding that there was no clear or convincing 
evidence that Flieger's bar complaint against Curtis fell within the purview of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct)). The record also reflects that Curtis did 
send a letter to the Idaho Court of Appeals to correct a clerical error regarding the 
charges Flieger was ultimately convicted of. (R., p.1250.) 
Flieger has failed to demonstrate facts, which, if true, entitle him to relief 
as to any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This Court should 
therefore affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition. 
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D. Flieger Has Failed To Show He Is Entitled To Relief As To Any Of His Non-
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
On appeal, Flieger states that each of the claims he raised in his post-
conviction petition pertained to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's 
brief, p.1.) Further, each of the issue headings in the Appellant's brief reference 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-41.) However, in the 
argument section of his brief, and in his brief in support of his petition for post-
conviction relief submitted below, Flieger clearly alleges violations of other 
constitutional rights. (See Appellant's brief; R., pp.72-159.) The state responded 
to these claims in its motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.1251-1280.) 
Again, because the district court adopted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal in dismissing Flieger's post-conviction petition, the state relies on this 
same motion to construe Flieger's claims. Below, the state construed Flieger as 
asserting the following non-ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) various 
sub-claims relating to his motion to suppress; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) 
speedy trial right violation; (4) judicial misconduct in questioning witness Berry; 
(5) violation of his double jeopardy rights at sentencing; and (6) abuse of 
sentencing discretion. (Id.) 
Flieger has failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal as 
to any of these claims. At the outset, Flieger waived each of these claims by 
failing to raise them previously. Post-conviction relief proceedings are not a 
substitute for proceedings in the trial court, or for an appeal from the sentence or 
conviction. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430, 835 P.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 
1992) (citing I.C. § 19-4901(b)). Aside from his claim of ineffective assistance of 
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appellate counsel, Flieger has made no attempt to argue why any of these non-
ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not have been raised previously. 
Additionally, many of these claims are disproven by the record or clearly fail as a 
matter of law. 
1. Claims Relating To The Motion To Suppress 
With regard to his motion to suppress, Flieger asserts: the state submitted 
false affidavits, the state withheld exculpatory evidence, and the court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. (See R., pp.1262-1263.) In addition to being 
waived, these claims are conclusory and unsupported by admissible evidence. 
As discussed above, Flieger has failed to present any admissible evidence 
demonstrating his allegations that the state submitted false affidavits or engaged 
in any other type of misconduct with respect to the motion to suppress. The 
district court's conclusions in denying Flieger's motions were based upon 
credibility determinations made in favor of the testifying officer, and factual 
findings based on audio recordings of the stop. (R., pp.1109-1114.) Flieger has 
not attempted to show that the determinations were clearly erroneous. He can 
therefore not show that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Flieger asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by: filing 
probation violations, intimidating witnesses, refusing to provide exculpatory 
evidence, intentionally delaying the trial, making false statements, withholding 
evidence from the state lab, deporting a witness, and referencing his post-
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Miranda silence during the trial. (See R., pp.1262, 1269-1270, 1274-1275.) 
Flieger has failed to present admissible evidence supporting any of these claims. 
As discussed above, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already addressed 
the state's trial reference to his post-Miranda silence, and held that while these 
references were inappropriate, they were harmless. Flieger, 2011 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 514, p.5. The doctrine of res judicata precludes any re-litigation of 
this claim. See Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 797-798, 291 P.3d 474, 480-481 
(2012) ("In post-conviction proceedings, Idaho appellate courts have applied the 
related principles of res judicata to bar an attempt to raise, in an application for 
post-conviction relief, the same issue previously decided in a direct appeal."). 
Finally, Flieger's apparent allegations regarding lab misconduct at the 
Idaho State lab in Pocatello are also disproven by the record. The Idaho State 
Police disclosed that four lab analysts violated internal policies in the course of 
their employment at the Pocatello lab. (R., pp.379-409, 761-763.) The violations 
concerned the handling of controlled substances unrelated to any testing of 
drugs in any criminal case, and the incidents did not ultimately impact the lab's 
accreditation. (Id.) The drugs associated with Flieger's convictions were tested 
in the Meridian lab, not the Pocatello lab. (R., pp.683, 729-731.) None of the 
disclosed misconduct regarding the Pocatello lab implicated the Meridian lab, or 
occurred at the Meridian lab. (R., p.762.) Therefore, even if this claim had not 
been waived, Flieger has failed to allege facts demonstrating he is entitled to 
relief. 
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any admissible evidence establishing "Booger's" identity, or demonstrating what 
exactly he would have testified to. Further, the postponement of Flieger's trial 
was based entirely upon Flieger's own failure to communicate with his defense 
attorney or probation officer by the eve of trial following the issuance of a warrant 
for his arrest. (See R., pp.303-304; 363-366.) 
4. "Judicial Misconduct" In Questioning Witness 
Flieger asserts that the district court committed "misconduct" by improperly 
questioning defense witness Jason Berry. (See R., pp.1270-1272.) Even if this 
claim were not waived, Flieger has failed to demonstrate facts, which, if true, 
demonstrate he is entitled to relief. 
During the trial, Flieger attempted to introduce hearsay testimony from 
Berry regarding statements allegedly made by "Booger"/"Juan," the individual 
whom Flieger alleges left the drugs found in his vehicle. (R., pp.906-910.) Berry 
testified outside the presence of the jury. (R., pp.910-930.) Prior to this 
testimony, the district court advised Berry of his Fifth Amendment rights against 
self-incrimination. (R., p.910.) The court also asked Berry whether he felt any 
pressure or compulsion from anyone to either waive or assert his rights, whether 
he had adequate time to discuss the matter with his attorney, and other routine 
questions. (R., pp.910, 947.) Berry invoked his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination numerous times over the course of his testimony, and 
eventually made a blanket invocation cutting off all further questioning. (R., 
pp.910-930, 947.) Following Berry's testimony, the district court excluded Berry's 
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statements that constituted inadmissible hearsay (R., pp.944-945), but permitted 
Flieger to read a redacted version of the testimony to the jury. (R., pp.952-964). 
Even if this claim had not been waived, Flieger has failed to demonstrate 
"judicial misconduct." A district court has the authority to ask questions of 
witnesses. I.R.E. 614(b). The court's inquiries regarding Flieger's Fifth 
Amendment rights were also entirely proper. In fact, when a witness invokes the 
Fifth Amendment in response to a question, the trial court must determine 
whether the refusal to answer is in fact justifiable under the privilege, and 
whether it is supported by more than a vague, subjective fear of prosecution. 
!;JL Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323, 955 P.2d 1102 (1998). Flieger's apparent 
frustration that Berry was not willing to answer all of the questions posed to him 
does not render the court's Fifth Amendment advisement inappropriate. For 
these reasons, Flieger has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief on this 
claim. 
5. Double Jeopardy Violation At Sentencing 
Flieger asserts that the district court violated his double jeopardy rights by 
considering conduct other than that for which he was convicted in making its 
sentencing determination. (See R., pp.1272-1273.) Flieger's claim is conclusory, 
waived, and in any event, fails as a matter of law. A trial judge may consider a 
myriad of factors in imposing a sentence. See State v. Wicke!, 126 Idaho 578, 
580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994); !.C.R. 32. This broad spectrum 
includes a defendant's past criminal history and, with due caution, "the existence 
of [a] defendant's alleged criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, 
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or where charges have been dismissed." Wicke!, 126 Idaho at 581, 887 P.2d at 
1088, (citing State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 825 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1992)); see 
also State v. Stewart, 122 Idaho 284, 286, 833 P.2d 917, 919 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The district court did not violate Flieger's double jeopardy rights by considering 
Flieger's other conduct in making its sentencing determination. 
6. Cruel And Unusual Punishment/Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
Finally, Flieger asserts that his three concurrent unified life sentences with 
10 years fixed for possession of methamphetamine constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of his constitutional rights, and an abuse of the district 
court's sentencing discretion. (See R., pp.1272-1273.) Flieger has failed to 
demonstrate he is entitled to relief. 
Post-conviction relief proceedings are not the proper avenue for 
challenging a district court's exercise of sentencing discretion. Ramirez v. State, 
113 Idaho 87, 741 P.3d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). In any event, the district court's 
sentence in this case was clearly reasonable in light of Flieger's extensive 
criminal history and previous failed opportunities on community supervision. 
(See R., pp.1230-1233 (the district court discussing the rationale behind its 
sentencing determination at the sentencing hearing).) 
Each of Flieger's non-ineffective assistance counsel claims are waived 
because they were not previously raised. In any event, Flieger failed to assert 
facts, which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief as to any of these 
claims. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's summarily dismissal 
of Flieger's post-conviction petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Flieger's petition for post-conviction relief. 
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